Sunday, May 31, 2009
It is easy to be cheated (2) - Capital Protected Products
Benchmark premium rates
Different Types of Life Insurance Policies
Preparing your case in FIDREC
Saturday, May 30, 2009
It is easy to be cheated (1) - Introduction
AGM of NTUC Income
Logic Quiz 4-1 (Vol 4)
There are four houses with different colours in a row. Each occupant plays a different sport and drinks a different beverage.
2. The golf player lives in the last house.
3. The volleyball player lives in the grey house.
4. The rugby player drinks rum.
5. The scientist plays cricket.
6. The green house is left of the grey house.
7. The engineer lives in the blue house.
8. The accountant lives left of the scientist.
9. The salesman lives in the first house.
10. The vodka drinker lives in the purple house.
Question: Who drinks wine?
Record your time and give your answer here. You will be given the correct answer, after you submit your entry.
Benchmark
1 to 5 mins: very good
5 to 10 min: good
10 to 15 mins: fair
more than 15 mins: need more practice!
More of the quiz
It appears every Sunday in The New Paper.
You can buy my book at these bookstores:
The spectre of death
Uncertain distribution of bonuses
Puzzle - The three coins
Puzzle: The Bicycles and the Fly
Friday, May 29, 2009
Engineer Quiz
What is the 6th number?
1, 2, 6, 42, 1806, ________? So what is the next number???
Give your answer here.
SCMP:400 investors lose millions in echo of minibonds scandal
In a disturbing echo of the Lehman minibonds scandal, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has received more than 400 complaints from people who have lost hundreds of millions of dollars on a complex credit-linked product designed and sold by US investment bank Morgan Stanley.
The bank sold HK$2.1 billion of the products, called Octave notes, through 16 local retail banks, including ABN Amro, Bank of China (Hong Kong) and Wing Lung, between 2004 and 2007. Eighteen series of the notes were sold, of which 10 have lost more than 90 per cent of their value. Three - series 10, 11 and 12 - are worthless.
The HKMA revealed the complaints yesterday. It said the banks had sold the Octave notes to about 8,300 customers.
Lawmaker Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee called yesterday for much stronger regulation of financial products sold to retail investors.
She said she had been contacted by people who had suffered big losses on the Morgan Stanley products but had not understood their nature. "The people who have contacted me are ordinary grass-roots people. They are not wealthy," she said.
Like most minibonds, the Octave notes contain synthetic collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which in the United States and Europe are sold only to professional investors.
"They [Octave investors] sounded very similar to the Lehman investors, who didn't know the products they bought were so risky," Mrs Ip said.
Some 48,000 Hongkongers lost most of the HK$20 billion they invested in minibonds issued or guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the bank collapsed in September.
Synthetic CDOs are complex, conceptual products that mimic the financial health of a pool of companies. When businesses collapse, the CDOs lose value. Many of the Octave notes are virtually worthless because they were connected to the financial performance of firms that went bust.
Information that Morgan Stanley has posted on a dedicated Octave website illustrates the toxic mess.
Octave series 21, for example, is now worth 0.37 HK cents per dollar invested. It contained a CDO linked to the financial performance of some very troubled companies. These include Icelandic bank Glitnir, which collapsed in October, and US carmaker Chrysler, which entered bankruptcy protection on April 30. Notes that were priced at a fraction of their original value had a high chance of becoming worthless soon, informed sources said.
Only one Octave note is trading at anything approaching a healthy valuation. Series one, issued in 2004, is priced at 68 HK cents per dollar invested.
A spokesman for the regulator said it had taken steps to stop such a debacle recurring. "The HKMA has taken a number of steps, including the issuance of circulars and reminders, to ensure that banks implement adequate measures to manage the risks associated with retail investment products," he said.
The regulator has also asked banks to keep their relationship managers well briefed so they can handle customer inquiries.
A new era for capitalism
Rights issues - risk to small shareholders
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Political changes in Singapore
Zurich Vista Plan
Monday, May 25, 2009
Tax incentive and commission
Online Sudoku
Sunday, May 24, 2009
BOC HK's mini-bond holders demand settlement ASAP
On Thursday the mini-bond holders gathered outside the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre, Wan Chai, during the annual meeting at the company's headquarters there, asking the bank to resolve the issue with the mini-bonds as soon as possible.
The bank has already deployed resources to deal with the matter, said President He Guangbei, adding that the bank is handling the issue actively and seriously and expects to wrap up the cases soon. The bank has set up an internal audit committee and continues to discuss the matter with regulators.
However, he provided no timetable.
http://www.chinaknowledge.com/
Brain Workout in The New Paper
Saturday, May 23, 2009
Terminating an existing life policy
I have bought a vivolife policy 2 yrs ago. Recently, I am thinking of increasing my coverage as I am planning to start a family soon.
After reading your blog, I am thinking of the following: switch to term plan and invest my savings on equity personally. Do you think it's advisable?
REPLY
Please read this FAQ before you take your decision to terminate the Vivolife policy.
If you terminate the policy now, you will lose a large part of what you have paid during the past two years. If you look at the cost for the next five or ten years, you can get a better idea about the advantages of making a switch.
You should also find out the cost of the term insurance policy and critical illness coverage.
It is advisable to take up a term insurance policy, rather than a whole life policy, but a decision to terminate an existing whole life policy has to be considered separately on its merits.
What to do about your endowment policy
Lehman Role Probed in Selling Securities
The Justice Department has questioned several former executives at Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. as part of its criminal investigation into whether they sold supposedly safe, liquid securities to clients while knowing that the market for the securities was drying up.
Prosecutors from the U.S. attorney's office in Brooklyn and lawyers from the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent weeks interviewed several former executives who ran Lehman's auction-rate-securities business, these people said. Auction-rate securities are short-term debt instruments in which the interest rates reset at periodic auctions.
The Standard: Minibond fury hits BOCHK
The minibond holders yesterday gathered outside the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre, Wan Chai, where the bank was holding its annual shareholders' meeting, as well as at its headquarters, demanding that cases be wrapped up soon.
Bank management came under fire at the meeting with half the questions related to the minibonds controversy.
``You said you are concerned about the issue, but you are just paying lip service,'' one shareholder said.
President He Guangbei replied that the bank has already deployed resources to deal with the matter.
``We are handling the issue actively and seriously and hope to settle the cases as soon as possible,'' He said.
An internal audit committee has been set up, and discussions with regulators are continuing.
But He could not give a settlement timetable.
The bank denied speeding up settlements and raising the starting point for resolving the issue because of political pressure _ a claim made by Peter Chan Kwong-yue, chairman of the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims.
``We are handling each case individually as each has a different claims level,'' He said.
Chan claimed that since April 1 the bank has sped up the process and raised the starting level of claims from 10-20 percent to 50 percent to avoid protests on the anniversary of the handover.
The BOCHK chief declined to say whether it will have to fork out more on Lehman-related issues in 2009, after last year's HK$700 million.
``The expenses last year covered costs that might also be incurred this year,'' He said.
Separately, the bank said it has no plans as yet to issue yuan bonds locally and its parent, Bank of China (3988), has no plans to privatize BOCHK.
Reuters.com - Singapore's Temasek defends costly Bank of America exit
By Kevin Lim and Saeed Azhar
SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Singapore's Temasek defended its money-losing exit from Bank of America
The explanation, a rarity for the state investor, came in a letter to major Singapore newspapers after the loss on BofA attracted fierce criticism from the usually muted pro-government local media, investors and independent blogs, which noted BofA shares have rallied more than 70 percent after Temasek's exit.
The losses are also expected to be discussed when Singapore's Parliament convenes next week.
Temasek, which is headed by Ho Ching, the wife of Singapore's prime minister, sold its 3 percent stake in BofA in the first quarter after converting its Merrill shares into BofA in January. Temasek has not said how much it lost in the process, but Reuters estimated the loss was more than $3 billion.
Temasek announced in February that Ho will step down and be replaced by Chip Goodyear, the former CEO of BHP Billiton
"Our investment thesis had changed from Merrill's specific businesses to the more diversified BoA linkage to the broader U.S. economy. The risk-return environment had also changed substantially," Myrna Thomas, managing director for corporate affairs, said in the letter.
Temasek's aim is to ensure that its portfolio delivers returns that are higher than the cost of capital employed on a risk-adjusted basis, Thomas said.
"We may choose to divest an investment, even at a loss, to optimize our risk or portfolio exposure, or if there are better opportunities elsewhere or later," she added.
Temasek, which like other sovereign wealth funds, plowed billions into Merrill Lynch in the early phase of the credit crisis, saw the value of its portfolio plunge 31 percent to S$127 billion between March 31 and Nov 30 last year during the severe market turmoil.
KEY QUESTION UNANSWERED
Financial investments accounted for 40 percent of its portfolio.
"The letter doesn't give the answer that everybody is asking. How much did they lose?," Leong Sze Hian, president of the Society of Financial Services Professionals, told Reuters.
The exact losses are difficult to quantify because Temasek had also offloaded about 30 million Merrill shares last year in smaller lots, reducing its exposure to the investment bank by the time BofA took over Merrill.
Conraj Raj, editor-at-large at the Today newspaper in Singapore, threw the spotlight on the sovereign wealth fund's stated strategy of taking a long-term view of its investments.
"After all, it has been drummed into us ad nauseam that both Temasek and its cousin, the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, invest for the long term with a time horizon that could stretch for as long as 50 years," he wrote on May 18.
"Whatever happened to the sovereign wealth fund's (SWF) strategy of taking a long-term view of its investments?"
Singapore's bigger sovereign wealth fund, GIC, on the other hand said it was a long-term investor in Citigroup
"It is difficult to understand why a long-term investor like Temasek was willing to stick with a dud like Australia's ABC Learning centers to the end, but did not try to exercise a little bit more patience with a U.S. government-backed entity like BofA," Png Eng Huat wrote in a letter to Straits Times forum.
"The U.S. government has stated clearly that it will not nationalize BofA even though it is technically the largest shareholder of the bank."
(Editing by Muralikumar Anantharaman)
China Daily:Settlements complicate Lehman inquiry
Yam made the revelation Friday as he was grilled by legislators in the Legislative Council subcommittee hearing on the Lehman Brothers products disaster.
"We can still get the information we need from banks," he said. "However, we cannot make verification with the investors (under terms of settlement agreements, investors are prohibited from disclosing information about their individual cases). That makes our investigation difficult."
Yam's revelation immediately drew criticism from subcommittee members. James To accused the authority of protecting the banks.
"How can you let this happen to hinder your investigation?" he demanded.
Yam defended the authority, countering that it could not stop investors from settling their complaints with the banks that sold the instruments.
"If we imposed restrictions on banks because of the difficulty involved in the investigations, the investors may not be able to reach settlements and get back their money. That is not fair to them," he said.
Yam, who will retire in October, has been grilled by the subcommittee on six occasions. Friday's hearing saw repetition of earlier incidents, with Yam's testimony interrupted by shouts from angry investors in the public gallery. Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai was forced to call five-minute adjournments on two occasions so that the furor from the gallery could be quieted.
Financial services sector legislator Chim Pui-chung and Hong Kong Island constituency legislator Regina Ip said the authority failed to prevent banks from employing hard-sell tactics to persuade investors to buy Lehman Brothers financial products.
"One of the investors purchased the product through her daughter working in the banks. The daughter has not gone through any training. The bank hires her, and she is just trying hard to sell the products to her relatives as well. It is a problem for banks to set a selling quota for the staff to achieve," she said.
Yam reiterated that the authority does not tolerate irregular sales practices and will deal with the matter seriously.
"If the investors, under the cold call practice, are not interested in the product, and the investors purchased the products simply because the banks or agents called them saying they have money in their accounts, this will not be tolerated," he said.
He said the authority asked about 50 banks to conduct self-assessments in 2008.
He added that the authority would be more thorough when assessing banks in the future.
The authority deputy chief executive Choi Yiu-kwan will give evidence at a hearing of the subcommittee in June. But chairman Ho said legislators intend to recall Yam to give further evidence after Choi's testimony.
SCMP:Yam denies shielding banks from scrutiny
Joseph Yam Chi-kwong denied he was shielding banks from scrutiny.
He was testifying for the sixth time to the Legislative Council panel inquiring into the alleged mis-selling by banks of credit-linked derivatives, including minibonds, issued or guaranteed by Lehman Brothers. At the end of last year, three months after the American bank filed for bankruptcy - causing 48,000 Hong Kong investors to lose much or all of the HK$20 billion they put into such products - 17 banks paid HK$257 million to settle 616 investors' claims.
"My view is that the HKMA doesn't have any power to interfere with the relationship between the banks and their clients, even if an investor has promised the bank to withdraw their complaint or to not make available further information," Mr Yam told the subcommittee.
"We can still get hold of the information we require from the banks. Of course, if we cannot get information from the investors to corroborate, then it would be more difficult to proceed with the investigation."
He said he would seek legal advice as to whether the inclusion of such conditions in settlements with investors was against the public interest.
A spokesman for the authority said the outcome of such settlements would not affect its investigations.
The authority has received nearly 21,000 complaints about banks' sale of minibonds. Despite their name, minibonds are complex products that derive part of their value from underlying credit instruments.
An authority circular issued in March said banks should not include in settlement agreements clauses that stopped investors disclosing relevant information to regulators.
Democratic Party lawmaker James To Kun-sun called on Mr Yam to reconsider allowing banks to impose such conditions, since they might interfere with the authority's statutory duty to regulate banks. Mr Yam said he would reconsider, but insisted that restricting banks would be unfair if it affected minibond investors' ability to reach a settlement.
Questioned by lawmakers yesterday, Mr Yam sought to show that the authority was on top of the situation. Inspections of bank activities continued between 2003 and 2007 even though there were not many cases of suspected mis-selling of such derivatives, he said. Around the middle of last year, the authority identified more cases of suspected mis-selling. In February last year, the authority set out to investigate 11 banks selling high-risk derivatives, but launched investigations into only four.
Yesterday's Legco session was interrupted three times by rowdy spectators in the public gallery calling for Mr Yam to step down. He will retire on October 1 after 16 years in the job.
Saturday, May 16, 2009
Pledge by public servants
Survey - social benefits and taxation
Running a business on sound principles
SCMP:Authority suspected banks of mis-selling
There was "not sufficient information to show it was an industry-wide problem", he said.
Credit-linked derivatives, most of them minibonds issued or guaranteed by Lehman, lost much or all of their value after it collapsed last year amid the global financial crisis. Some 48,000 Hongkongers had invested HK$20 billion in such products.
Mr Yam said the authority set out to investigate 11 banks selling such products - including Lehman-linked ones - in February last year because of their high risks. But only four banks were investigated and that process was disrupted when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
Of the four, three were suspected of mis-selling, Mr Yam said. One has since been found guilty of misconduct in connection with the sale of credit-linked products; the other two are still under investigation.
Mr Yam said the inquiry last year identified problems with the way these banks' frontline staff explained to clients the nature of the products and their main risks, staff understanding of the products and staff management systems; and found sales documents were faulty and did not give detailed risk assessments for the products.
Lawmakers criticised the authority for not widening the investigation or alerting the public in time.
"There were about 20 banks selling Lehman products. Why did you not investigate all other banks immediately when you found three out of four problematic?" Ronny Tong Ka-wah of the Civic Party asked.
Independent Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee said: "What you identified in the probe were critical problems. If you had called a halt to such malpractice across the industry in time, and informed the public about that, you'd have saved many people."
Mr Yam said the authority did not have enough information at the time to show there was industry-wide malpractice. He also said the authority was investigating four complaints from bank staff about "oppressive" managements who based incentives solely on sales volume, regardless of any malpractice.
The authority considered having investigators pose as customers to check banks' sales practices, but did not do so since the Securities and Futures Commission did not use the practice and "we have to conform with their standards", Mr Yam said.
Friday, May 15, 2009
Second Lehman-backed catastrophe bond defaults
LONDON (Reuters) - A second Lehman Brothers-backed catastrophe bond is in default after issuer Ajax Re Ltd failed to repay principal in full at maturity, according to credit rating agencies.
The $100 million bond, issued in April 2007 to give Bermuda-based Aspen Insurance Holdings Ltd cover against losses from earthquakes in California, had been expected to default following the collapse of Lehman, its effective guarantor.
Credit rating agency Standard & Poor's said in a May 11 statement that it had lowered its rating on the bond to D, signifying default, and withdrawn the rating.
It said Ajax Re had paid all the interest due on the bond, "but the ultimate payment of principal was not made in full on May 8, 2008 due to a shortfall in the realizable value of the collateral assets under the TRS (total return swap)."
S&P had said a default was likely despite a timely payment of interest on March 16.
The deal is among four catastrophe bonds that used a unit of Lehman Brothers as TRS counterparty, contracted to ensure the collateral backing the bonds was sufficient to meet interest and principal repayments, and to make up any shortfall.
When the U.S. investment bank filed for bankruptcy on September 15, investors were left with direct exposure to market losses on the collateral assets, and the bonds were downgraded.
Another of the bonds, issued by Willow Re with Allstate Corp as ceding insurer, was already in default after Willow failed to make in full a February 2 interest payment.
Another rating agency, insurance specialist A.M. Best, also said it had downgraded the Ajax Re notes to "d" following the failure to fully repay the principal at redemption.
Insurers have used catastrophe bonds since the 1990s to manage their exposure to natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes by transferring potential losses to investment funds. Investors receive a high rate of interest but risk losing part or all of their principal if a catastrophe occurs.
(Reporting by Catherine Evans; Editing by Simon Jessop)
British Columbia, Canada
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Photos from the Canadian Rockies
Monday, May 11, 2009
Questions for the AGM of NTUC Income, 29 May 2009
If you are a policyholder and wish to attend the annual general meeting, you can send your request to the cooperative secretary at this address (lakshmi.b@income.com.sg). You can also send in your own questions.
I wish to ask a few questions on behalf of many policyholders who bought life insurance from NTUC Income on the understanding that it is a cooperative working in the interest of its policyholders.
NTUC Income reduced its bonus rates for several series of policies last year, in spite of excellent investment results. At the annual general meeting, the chairman gave the following assurances to the policyholders:
a) While special bonuses are not guaranteed, they are designed to ensure that the reduction in annual bonus is compensated. As I have indicated earlier, the new bonus structure is aimed at improving, the total payout to policyholders.
b) Should the special bonus in future reduce due to adverse financial conditions, we are committed to restoring it when conditions improve.
c) I have stated that this Board will look after the policyholders’ interests. Towards this end, the Board will ensure that the bonus allocated to policyholders result in payouts is fair and consistent with the experience of the Life Fund.
There is an announcement that the bonus cut will be extended to all other series of policies this year.
My questions are:
1. What is the total amount of bonus that were reduced in 2007 and 2008 compared to the bonuses that would have been declared if the bonuses had been maintained at the same rates declared in 2006. Please provide the actuarial value of the bonuses that have been reduced, in millions of dollars, for the policies that were affected.
2. What is the amount of management and selling expenses incurred for the life insurance business for 2006, 2007 and 2008. Are steps being taken to reduce these expenses in line with the reduction in bonuses suffered by the policyholders?
3. Please explain how the reduction in bonus can achieve a better payout to policyholders? With the reduction in the bonus last year, was the cooperative able to invest the undistributed surplus to earn a higher return for policyholders?
4. Will the cooperative be able to maintain the special bonus payable on maturity and surrender, which was adjusted to compensate for the reduction in the annual bonuses? Is there any likelihood that the special bonus will have to be reduced, due to the global financial crisis?
5. For policies which have matured since the last AGM, was the cooperative able to meet the promise that the payout will be fair and based on the actual experience of the fund? Where the actual payouts were short of what is due to them, does the cooperative intend to make the appropriate adjustment for these policyholders?
6. Based on renewals made in recent months, what is the average rate of increase in motor insurance premium paid by policyholders who did not make any claim during the past year? Does the cooperative intend to control its expenses and claims to allow it to reduce the premium rates for its policyholders? What steps are being taken to achieve this goal?
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Differential pricing for petrol
Wearing masks
Saturday, May 9, 2009
Promises made at the NTUC Income AGM in 2008
- Some policyholders have raised specific concerns on the special bonus in blogs. Allow me to address them.
- While special bonuses are not guaranteed, they are designed to ensure that the reduction in annual bonus is compensated. As I have indicated earlier, the new bonus structure is aimed at improving, the total payout to policyholders.
- Should the special bonus in future reduce due to adverse financial conditions, we are committed to restoring it when conditions improve.
- I have stated that this Board will look after the policyholders’ interests. Towards this end, the Board will ensure that the bonus allocated to policyholders result in payouts is fair and consistent with the experience of the Life Fund.
- While special bonuses are not guaranteed, they are designed to ensure that the reduction in annual bonus is compensated. As I have indicated earlier, the new bonus structure is aimed at improving, the total payout to policyholders.
NTUC Income's Bonus Cut
Scenes from Vancouver, Canada
SCMP:Sanctions loom in Lehman investigation
It had concluded its investigation into the 48 complaints and was considering disciplinary action, the authority said yesterday.
But it would decide on what action to take only after it had heard from those against whom the complaints were lodged.
"A number of cases are at a very advanced stage of the enforcement process. Before making a final determination in these cases, we have to go through due process to ensure fairness, including giving the subjects of investigation an opportunity to be heard," it said.
If found guilty, an executive officer of a financial institution could be withdrawn or suspended from office, and a financial practitioner's registration could be removed or suspended under the Banking Ordinance, an authority spokesman said.
An institution could have its registration revoked or suspended by the Securities and Futures Commission, be subject to a reprimand, a fine or a prohibition order. Employees of the firm who were involved could also be similarly sanctioned.
Some 48,000 Hongkongers lost most of the HK$20 billion they invested in credit-linked derivatives, such as minibonds, issued or guaranteed by Lehman Brothers when the US investment bank collapsed in September. Many of them have accused financial institutions that sold them the products of misconduct. By Thursday, the authority had received a total of 20,913 such complaints.
Hours before the announcement the authority's chief executive, Joseph Yam Chi-kwong, told a Legislative Council hearing that mis-selling was inevitable because of the variable quality of bank employees.
Responding to criticism by financial services legislator Chim Pui-chung that the authority had not fulfilled its regulatory duties, Mr Yam said: "It is like crime ... always exists in the society. Are law enforcement departments responsible for that?"
The authority recently hired 40 more employees to handle complaints of mis-selling, he said, and would continue its recruitment to raise the current number of 243 officers to 300.
Peter Chan Kwong-yue, chairman of the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims in Hong Kong, welcomed the possible sanctions in the 48 cases.
Mr Chan also said the alliance was arranging a meeting with the Bank of China (Hong Kong) to discuss compensation.
In yet another protest, dozens of investors stormed the Citibank headquarters in Central in the afternoon. They were removed by police in the evening.
Friday, May 8, 2009
Perils of global banking
Electric powered vehicle
Pleasant weather in Vancouver, Canada
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Lower alert level for Influenza A (H1N1)
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Strong recovery in Singapore stockmarket
I did not buy any shares during this period, so I missed the rally. But I did not sell any shares either, during the decline from 2400 to 1400. So, they cancelled out.
This illustrates the importance of staying invested, for a long term investor. If one gets out of the market, when conditions are gloomy, one is likely to miss the rally. It is difficult to time the market. It is better to invest for the long term, and take a long term view.
Even the experts like Warren Buffet adviced investors to take a long term view and invest over a time frame of 10 years or longer.
Alaska
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Survey: Competition and Fair Trading
Monday, May 4, 2009
Are bonuses declared fairly?
I have come to realise my folly in buying substantial insurance for myself and family ranging from endowments, whole life, etc. All along, I am told buying insurance is also saving for the future - how wrong I have been. Now I am aware that term life is still the best in terms of value. Now I have to consider how to handle the current policies that I have, especially those where I have to pay for "life".
Last month, I received a Bonus Notice that informed me of the reversionary bonus for 2008 (Endowment policy). I was told that "Due to current market conditions, your Projected Matuity Value at this point in time is revised to $71,491 from $87,786. This revision is done to reflect the reduction in value of the fund's assets."
I bought this policy in 1997. The yearly premium of $1,400 is deducted from my CPF OA account. At that time, the projected return is much more than if I leave the money in CPF. In Feb 2008 that I was told the projected maturity value is $87,786, with a yield to maturity of 4.41%.
In one year, I am now informed of this drastic reduction in just 2 sentences. What I cannot comprehend is the way life insurance company is able to decide unilaterally whatever value they want to reduce even when it affects the insurance buyers so much. In that case, the insurance buyers always lose, insurers always win.
In good times, the insurers make money, then in bad times, the insurance company still make money by just reducing bonuses on the insurance policies. There is no equity. Will you help me to understand why this is so?
REPLY
The question that you asked has troubled me a lot in the past two years.
When I was in charge of NTUC Income, I made sure that the policyholders are given a fair deal. In bad years, the bonus are reduced, but in good years, the bonus are increased.
I now get the impression that many insurance companies are not practicing a fair approach in treating their policyholders.
I suggest that you should raise your question with MAS or with the Consumer Association of Singapore (CASE) and see if they are willing to take up this point as a matter of public interest or consumer protection.
SCMP: Minibond meetings
China Daily: are leaders retired?
May the rulers be righteous
While I am inspired by your selfless effort to embark on the mission of educating Singaporeans on issues relating to insurance, financial investment and current affair, I think it is a matter of dire urgency to educate Singaporeans on the importance of political awareness. This will decide if Singapore as a society has a bright future.
For too long, the ruling elites have successfully succumbed the population into political apathy through undemocratic oppression, threats of litigation and many other shrewd social engineering strategies. At the same time, the past few decades have seen economic prosperity largely because of the world economy and the hardworking culture of the local population who just wanted to earn a decent living. This complacency with a good life of the population has encouraged the ruling elites to justify their one-party rule by advancing the fallicious argument that the "too-good" life Singaporeans are enjoying cannot afford a two-party system and instilling the fear of not having the right talents to run the country, except those handpicked by the founding father.
This politcal apathy is a "killer" for the well being of Singapore. Foremost is to educate Singaporeans that a policy decided and implemented by the ruling elite, without thorough debate, discussion and scrutiny by the citizens, could end up having a disastrous impact on the future generations. This is not always felt immediate or the near term but until many years later. Some good examples are the elitist "graduate mother scheme", "the stop at two scheme", "Speak Mandarin scheme suppressing the proliferation of dialects", the victimisation of "Nanyang University" for political motive, and even the use of CPF for investment and housing has now become a constant concern for retirement.
Therefore, I urge you to focus your effort on educating Singaporens to speak up politically. Do not be complacent with the "good" life we have had, we must continue to play our part as responsible citizens and in all fairness to our children, our children;s children, to monitor, scrutinise and question polices mandated by the ruling elites. Singaporeans have to become aware that the ruling elites are not messiahs, saviours, gods, otherwise we would not have the current financial crisis we are going throught right now with the huge GIC and Temasek looses of monety belonging to Singaporeans.
Sunday, May 3, 2009
Available for rental: Thomson View #17-xx
Insurance company disallow revival of policy
Terminating existing policies
Contractor Particulars
Are we over-reacing to Influence A (H1N1)?
Saturday, May 2, 2009
Is Singapore over-populated with foreigners?
E-mail sent to me
There is no denying that every 1st world country needs foreigners to supplement its citizens to help drive its economy. BUT, is
| Population | Citizen | Non-citizen |
| 4,799,300 | 93.7% | 6.3% |
| 5,326,314 | 97.3% | 2.7% |
| 4,017,733 | 74.0% | 26.0% |
| 4,839,400 | 65.4% | 34.6% |